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SELLING ZONING: DO DENSITY BONUS
INCENTIVES FOR MODERATE-COST
HOUSING WORK?
ROBERT A. JOHNSTON
SEYMOUR L SCHWARTZ
GEOFFREY A. WANDESFORDE-SMITH
MICHAEL CAPLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many cities in the United States have adopted inclusionary housing
programs, which require developers to provide some units at below-
market rents or prices. The supporters' and critics2 of these housing
* Robert A. Johnston and Seymour I. Schwartz are associate professor and
professor, respectively, in the Division of Environmental Studies at the University of
California, Davis. Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith is associate professor in the
Department of Political Science and the Division of Environmental Studies at the
University of California, Davis. Michael Caplan was a research assistant in the
Division of Environmental Studies and is a planning consultant in San Francisco. The
authors thank Daniel Meyerowitz and Tom Infusino for research assistance and Martin
Gellen, Paul Sedway, Dan Sperling, Larry Wade, John Loomis, and Warren Jones for
valuable comments and suggestions. The help of John Woodbury of Concord and
Stephen Burke, Gale Brownell, Phillip Trowbridge, and Sam Watson of Santa Rosa is
greatly appreciated. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Public
Service Research and Dissemination Program at the University of California, Davis,
and the California Department of Housing and Community Development. Lastly, we
thank George Dutton of Santa Rosa for sharing project cost data.
1. See, e.g., A. MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (1984) (published by Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Re-
search); Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances: Policy and Legal Issues Requiring Private De-
velopers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432 (1974).
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programs agree that, to pass legal muster, inclusionary programs must
not reduce project profits below normal levels.3 Local governments,
then, must decide whether to offer financial incentives that would com-
pensate developers for the reduced value of controlled projects.
In 1979, the California Legislature adopted a statute requiring cities
and counties to grant prescribed density bonuses or equivalent financial
incentives to projects that provide specified percentages of units afford-
able to low- or moderate-income households. In effect, local govern-
ments now must "sell" zoning density increases to developers who, in
return, provide low- or moderate-income housing units at below-mar-
ket prices and rents.4
This Article reviews the housing affordability problem, the Califor-
nia legislation, and previous research findings. The Article outlines
2. See, ag., Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981).
3. See MALLACH, supra note 1, at 17-19, 33-36; Kleven, supra note 1, at 1524-28;
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1213-14.
4. Selling upzonings to the highest cash bidder has been suggested as a way to
recoup for the public the unearned increment in property values due to public improve-
ments and urban growth. Clawson, Why Not Sell Zoning and Rezoning? (Legally, That
Is) 2 CRY CAL. 1, 39 (1967). Under the density bonus program, the extra density is
granted to the developer who, in exchange, sells these units at below-market prices.
These subsidized units provide an external social good to the local community. The
California legislature adopted many other statutes intended to raise residential densities.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65913.1 (West 1983) requires residential zoning in "appropriate"
amounts and densities to meet the housing needs of all economic segments of the com-
munity. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583 (West 1983) requires that local general plan hous-
ing elements "make adequate provision for the existing and projected needs of all
economic segments of the community." Planners are required to "consider" the juris-
diction's fair share of regional housing needs in making long-term housing needs assess-
ments. Id. Some state policies are more specific and encourage density increases tied to
specific housing forms. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583 (West 1983), for example, requires
that local jurisdictions zone for higher densities to allow for multifamily structures.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65852.1 and 65852.2 (West 1983) require localities to allow small
second units on existing occupied single-family parcels. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21085
(West 1983) prohibits the reduction of residential densities pursuant to the California
Environmental Quality Act (California's impact reporting law), unless adverse impacts
cannot otherwise be mitigated. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589.5 (West 1983) requires that
if a city or county approves a residential development project at a density lower than
allowed by the local zoning or development policies, it must make formal findings that
the project would have "specific" adverse effects and that no other methods exist to
mitigate those effects. In challenging these findings, the burden of proof rests on the
city or county. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589.6 (West 1983). For a review of pertinent
statutes, see CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT, 101 STEPS TO BETTER HOUSING: THE CALIFORNIA HOUSING PLAN, 1982
(1982).
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our methods, presents our results, and recommends program
improvements.
A. The Housing Affordability Problem
Nationwide, the percentage of households able to purchase the me-
dian-priced new house fell from forty percent in the early 1970s to less
than ten percent in 198 L.' The program that this Article analyzes was
adopted in 1979, during this period of decreasing housing affordability.
The situation in California was worse than the problem nationwide.
House prices went from eight percent above the national average in
1973 to fifty percent above the national average in 1980.6 In 1979,
average raw land costs in California in areas zoned for single-family
houses were the highest in the nation at $143,000 an acre, compared to
a national average of $45,000.7
B. Exclusion
Local government regulatory behavior has adversely affected land
prices in many communities. Zoning in the United States has been
used from its inception to drive up housing costs and, thus, to exclude
ethnic minorities and the poor.8 Property values and "community
character" have been protected with large-lot zoning, floor-area mini-
mums, and prohibitions of apartments. 9
5. See S. SCHWARTZ & R. JOHNSTON, MEASURES FOR INCREASING THE SUPPLY
OF MODERATE-CoST HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1980) (published by the University
of California, Davis, Institute of Governmental Affairs).
6. Id. at 1; Schwartz & Johnston, Inclusionary Housing Programs, 49 J. AM. PLAN.
A. 3 (1983).
7. L. KATZ & K. ROSEN, THE EFFECTS OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING
PRICES 38-39 (University of California, Berkeley, Center for Real Estate and Urban
Economics Working Paper No. 80-13, 1980).
8. See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973); J. DE-
LAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1969); HOUSING FOR
ALL UNDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING, LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW
(R. Fishman ed. 1978); A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS (1973). See also Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinance upheld in deference to
legislative judgment).
9. See D. LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION (1976) (published by
Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research); Babcock & Callies, Ecology and
Housing: Virtues in Conflict, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY 205 (1973); Coke
& Liebman, Political Values and Population Density Controls, 38 LAND ECON. 347
(1961).
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C. State Housing Policy Alternatives
Four types of legislative policy changes have been suggested to over-
come surburban exclusion by lowering land costs and increasing resi-
dential densities for new construction. The first approach would have
states require cities and counties to provide for a variety of residential
densities, including ample multifamily zones.10 A second and more
radical approach would prohibit local governments from having any
density limits in residential zones.11 Neither of these proposals has
been adopted.
The third type of policy involves the regulation or construction of
housing directly by the state. Examples include New York's housing
development agency, which was exempt from local controls; Massa-
chusetts' "anti-snob" zoning act, which allowed developers of low- or
moderate-cost housing to appeal local zoning restrictions to a state
board; and California's coastal commission, which had permit author-
ity over housing projects in the coastal zone and required below-mar-
ket-price housing units in many projects.
These three approaches were terminated because of opposition from
local governments. California subsequently adopted a fourth and more
modest program that applies statewide.
D. The California Density Bonus Statute
The density bonus statute, adopted in 1979 and subsequently
amended, requires cities and counties to grant either a density bonus of
twenty-five percent or more or to provide other incentives of equivalent
financial value to developers of projects of five or more units if: (1)
10% of the units are to be affordable to households of low income
(80% or less of county median income); or (2) 25% of the units are to
be affordable to households of moderate income (80% to 120% of
county median income); or (3) 50% percent of the units are to be re-
stricted to elderly residents (sixty-two years of age or older). No ongo-
10, See Schwartz & Johnston, supra note, 6, at 24-25; K. ROSEN, CALIFORNIA
HOUSING MARKETS IN THE 1980s: DEMAND, AFFORDABILITY, AND POLICIES 95-97
(1984); D. DOWELL, THE SUBURBAN SQUEEzE (1984); E. LOVELACE & W. WEIS-
MANTEL, DENSITY ZONING: ORGANIC ZONING FOR PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT (Urban Land Inst. Tech. Bull. No. 42, 1961).
11. See Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward the Inclusionary Land
Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971); Lefcoe, California's Land Planning
Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 447 (1981).
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ing rent or price controls on the affordable units are required. 2 This
program is politically appealing because it requires no financial subsi-
dies from local or state governments and allows private developers to
act in their own self-interest.
E. Previous Research
Density bonuses were used in New York City in the 1960s to en-
courage office developers to provide plazas and other street-level amen-
ities."3 Beginning in the late 1960s, density bonuses have been used
occasionally by local jurisdictions to compensate residential developers
for the costs imposed on them by inclusionary housing requirements."'
Early bonus programs did not offer sufficient incentives to attract
many developers. 15 Montgomery County's mandatory program, which
allowed one bonus unit for every two affordable units, resulted in af-
fordable units that constituted five percent of the 25,000 residential
units built over several years. 16 Schwartz and Johnston found that a
bonus of at least one market unit for each affordable unit generally was
needed to generate developer participation.' 7 Large projects provide
affordable units more efficiently because smaller and lower quality
units can be built in separate structures.' 8
Ellickson states that mandatory inclusionary programs without suffi-
cient subsidies will raise the price of the market-rate units in the pro-
ject, which will reduce demand.19 Supply will subsequently decline,
leading to higher housing prices marketwide that harm all prospective
buyers and renters. Ellickson dismissed inclusionary programs by as-
suming that local governments will not grant density bonuses in good
faith. Mallach agrees that, without compensating incentives, inclusion-
ary programs may raise the price of market-rate housing. Nonetheless,
he believes that these programs will help moderate- and low-income
households by shortening the chain of moves as "trickle down" oper-
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65915(ff) (West 1983).
13. Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning: Legal Implications, 21 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 895 (1970).
14. Erber & Prior, The Trend in Housing Density Bonuses, 40 PLAN. 14 (1974).
15. Id.
16. Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing,
3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1046-53 (1976).
17. See Schwartz & Johnston, supra note 6, at 17, 19.
18. See Kleven, supra note 1, at 1467.
19. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1203.
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ates in the lower priced housing stock.2" Mallach stresses the need to
subsidize projects with density bonuses, mortgage revenue bonds, and
other incentives so that the market-rate units in these projects will not
experience price or rent increases.
Some analysts worry that the bonuses may be set too high. Because
land prices are often determined by the number of units subsequently
approved in the project, the prospect of density bonuses could increase
land prices. To avoid this result, the planning agencies must calculate
potential project profits and control bonus incentives to avoid excess
profits.21 Also, applying density bonuses to only a fraction of the
number of projects could help curtail the rise of land prices by prevent-
ing a general anticipation effect.22
Two reviews of inclusionary programs recommend that the rents
and prices of the designated units be controlled for up to sixty years
through deed restrictions to maximize program benefits.2a
II. METHODS
Based on the issues raised by previous investigators and by the Cali-
fornia statute itself, we identified four research questions that are im-
portant to understanding the program's operation: (1) How did the
level of incentives affect project profits? (2) How did county median
income (which determines allowable rent and price levels) and local
land prices affect participation by developers? (3) Do local agencies
vary incentives and income requirements to prevent project rates-of-
return from rising substantially above normal levels? and (4) Do local
governments impose ongoing rent and price controls to sustain pro-
gram benefits?
To address these four questions, we analyzed three primary data
sets: a statewide survey of cities and counties, two case studies of inno-
vative city programs, and a financial analysis of hypothetical projects.
We surveyed all California cities and counties in 1983 by mail and
asked them about their use of the program. Of the 493 jurisdictions,
248 responded (50.2%), with cities and counties of different population
levels fairly well represented. In a follow-up survey in 1984, we con-
ducted lengthy telephone interviews with planners and housing agency
20. See A. MALLACH, supra note 1, at 43.
21. See Kleven, supra note 1, at 1478-80.
22. See A. MALLACH, supra note 1, at 116.
23. Id. at 20; Schwartz & Johnston, supra note 6, at 18.
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personnel in the seventy-four cities and counties with the most ambi-
tious affordable housing programs.
Because of their creative use of density bonuses, we selected Santa
Rosa and Concord, both in northern California, for case studies. In
early 1985, we interviewed city staff personnel, gathered background
data, reviewed project files, and held discussions with developers who
were experienced with the cities' programs. We selected Santa Rosa, a
medium-sized city with moderately low land prices, because its density
bonus program employed high bonuses (up to 150%). We chose Con-
cord because it was a medium-sized city with fairly high land prices
and had an innovative program allowing bonuses of up to fifty percent.
These two detailed studies gave us a closer look at the financial effects
of bonuses and other incentives as well as the acceptability of rent and
price controls to developers.
Using data from the case studies, we performed a financial analysis
of typical density bonus projects, assuming that the affordable units
rent at the low-income rent level. We analyzed rental projects because
we believe that they will provide more low- and moderate-income units
than ownership housing. We used 1985 project data from Santa Rosa
and 1984 data from Concord.
III. RESULTS
A. Statewide Survey
Of the respondents to our statewide survey, fifty-five percent had a
program that offered a density bonus or other equivalent incentives.
Eighteen percent of respondents offered only the bonus incentive,
twelve percent used other incentives of equivalent financial value, and
twenty-five percent used both.24 The high rate of use of both bonus
and other incentives together indicates that bonuses, by themselves,
may not be financially adequate for developers, as previous research
suggests.25 The moderate participation rate (fifty-five percent) also
24. A survey conducted for the state about one year after our survey confirmed our
findings. This subsequent survey, which excluded small cities, found that 49% of the
jurisdictions had adopted density bonus programs. Of all jurisdictions, 25% offered
bonuses in conjunction with other incentives. The jurisdictions most frequently offered
the following incentives in addition to the standard bonuses (in order): fast permit re-
view, larger bonuses, and mortgage revenue bond (MRB) financing. Very few jurisdic-
tions offered the statutory bonus alone. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CALIFORNIA AFFORDABLE HOUSING LEGISLA-
TION v-16 (1984).
25. We assume that when local governments set program incentives above the state
1989]
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leads us to believe that the program is not profitable in some markets.
Moreover, only nineteen percent of respondents had granted density
bonuses or other incentives to more than three projects, which indi-
cates a lack of interest by developers in many parts of the state.
Ten jurisdictions had each awarded bonuses to projects totaling
more than one thousand bonus and market-rate units. These ten juris-
dictions had a wide range of populations, mean household incomes,
and raw land prices, so no pattern emerged that could explain the high
participation by developers.26
We estimated that two to four percent (4,457 to 8,914) of all residen-
tial units permitted in the state during 1980-1983 were affordable units
under the density bonus program. 27 This is a significant output for the
first three years of a voluntary program. A subsequent state survey
found that sixty-two percent of the cities and counties with participat-
ing developers had ongoing price and rent controls in effect for five to
fifty years.28
The surveys show that the program has been used by a majority of
cities and counties, but only by a few developers in most jurisdictions.
The program seems to have been intensively used in communities with
a wide range of incomes and reported land prices. We do not know,
however, the characteristics of the jurisdictions where the program has
not been used. To get a closer look at the relationship between incen-
tives and performance, we undertook the two case studies.
B. Case Studies
1. Santa Rosa
Santa Rosa's housing stock increased 83.7% from 1970 to 1980. In
1980, the median household income was $18,600 for a family of four
levels, they set the incentives at the minimum levels needed to obtain developer partici-
pation. In some jurisdictions, developers undoubtedly can obtain larger incentives than
they need to make normal profits.
26. Planners reported land prices in the jurisdictions.
27. The total number of units in density bonus projects was reported to be 44,576.
Based on earlier research, we estimated that 10-20% of these units were affordable
units. See Schwartz & Johnston, supra note 6, at 10-13. We extrapolated from our
sample to the state based on the percentage (62%) of the state's population in the juris-
dictions in our survey.
28. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 24, at v-1l.
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and the median rent was $292 per month.29 The rental vacancy rate
was 4.3%. The city council adopted an ordinance in late 198030 that
offered density bonuses (DBs) of as much 150% to developers.31 More
than 2,800 acres of vacant land zoned low- and medium-density resi-
dential were targeted for these DB projects. The developer could elect
to receive the state program's twenty-five percent bonus in addition to
the local program bonus. The optional state bonus required affordable
units in rental projects. The local bonus options, however, did not re-
quire developers to provide any affordable units in rental projects. The
city believed that mortgage revenue bond incentives, used in most
rental projects at the time, had strong enough restrictions. These re-
strictions required twenty percent or more low- or moderate-income
units, screening of incomes of renters, and rent controls for ten years or
more.
For ownership housing, affordable units were required under the lo-
cal program to be twenty-five percent of the bonus units granted to the
developer.32 The city housing authority screened purchasers, and the
price controls on the affordable purchase units ran in perpetuity (sixty
years, in effect). The city administered the resale transactions during
this time.
In addition to mortgage revenue bonds, granted to all projects with
fifty units or more and to most smaller projects, some projects were
given land write-downs through federal block grant funds.
As of mid-1984, about 4,000 total units had been approved in 54
density bonus projects. About 2,100 were rental units. Of the 1,900
ownership units, 273 were resale-controlled for moderate-income
households (about 15% of the total number of ownership units). The
program was used for almost all of the residential projects in 1980-
29. Low-income households, defined as those earning 80% or less of the county
median income, constitute 40% of Santa Rosa's households.
30. Santa Rosa, Cal., Policy 200-07 (Dec. 23, 1980) and Resolutions 14840, 15205
(Dec. 23, 1980).
31. Information presented in this section is derived from Santa Rosa city docu-
ments, including The Housing Element, November 16, 1984 (unpublished document
adopted by Santa Rosa, Cal., Resolution No. 17105 (Dec. 18, 1984)); interviews with
Gale Brownell and Stephen Burke of the Santa Rosa Housing Authority; G. Brownell,
Voluntary Inclusionary Zoning: Santa Rosa's Density Increase Program (1984) (un-
published master's thesis available at the University of San Francisco College of Profes-
sional Studies); and from confidential interviews with developers, planning
commissioners, and city council members.
32. The state program requires 25% of the original total number of project units to
be affordable, a much more stringent requirement.
1989]
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1984.33
The Santa Rosa experience indicates that bonuses higher than the
statutory bonuses can encourage widespread participation by develop-
ers. The large bonuses amounted to a de facto upzoning. Such large
incentives probably increased developer profits and may have led to an
increase in land prices, but we have no evidence to verify this theoreti-
cal expectation.34
2. Concord
In Concord, the median household income in 1980 was $22,130 and
the median rent was $287. The 1980 rental vacancy was 3.4%. Hous-
ing units increased by 55% from 1970 to 1980.3 1
In late 1984, Concord adopted a density bonus policy 36 that allowed
rental projects to receive density increases of up to fifty percent. Rent
levels were generally to be controlled for fifteen years. The city also
offered mortgage revenue bond financing and land write-down incen-
tives to both rental and ownership projects.
Ownership projects could receive density increases of up to twenty-
five percent. Rather than require long-term resale restrictions to main-
tain the affordability of the inclusionary ownership units, Concord used
a windfall recapture scheme. Through the scheme, the city was to re-
ceive the difference in value between the controlled price and the mar-
ket price. This was done using a second trust deed, due on sale. The
money paid to the city accumulated in a special revenue account desig-
nated for future use in low-income housing programs.37
33. The city was considering requiring rent controls and income screening for af-
fordable units in new rental projects in 1985 due to the success of the supply strategy in
raising the rental vacancy rate to 12%. Interview with G. Brownell, author of unpub-
lished master's thesis (Sept. 10, 1985).
34. Two local developers and one former city councilperson believed that the higher
densities caused greater land cost increases in areas designated for the program than in
areas not so designated.
35. Information presented in this section comes from Concord, Cal., General Plan
ch. 1.27 (Dec. 17, 1984); city development documents; interviews with John Woodbury,
Programs Coordinator with the Concord Housing and Community Development Office;
and discussions with local developers.
36. Concord, Cal., General Plan ch. 1.27 (Dec. 17, 1984).
37. A first trust deed for an "affordable" unit was financed at the market interest
rate by a private lender. The city held a second trust deed in the amount of the differ-
ence between the affordable price and the full market value. Payments on the second
trust deed were deferred for two years. Partial payments started in the third year and
rose to full payments in the sixth year. The balance of the second mortgage was due on
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/5
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Only four density bonus projects had been approved by mid-1984,
involving 88 of 1,482 total residential units approved from 1982
through 1984.38 Thus, the Concord program had only limited success
in facilitating affordable housing.
These density incentives clearly affected the way planning decisions
were made in Concord. After the density bonus policy was adopted,
the city was less willing to grant generous and unconditioned upzon-
ings.39 Affordable rents and sales prices became key factors the city
council considered in determining the appropriateness of granting
higher densities.
According to the planning director, land prices rose about fifty per-
cent from the end of 1982 to the end of 1984. He believed that these
increases were due to the mortgage revenue bond program and to
strong housing demand resulting from regional employment growth.'
Density bonuses probably were not a major contributor to higher land
prices, however, because only a fraction of residential projects during
1982-84 were awarded bonuses and landowners did not expect the pro-
gram to increase in use.
The limited number of projects using the density bonus program in-
dicates that developers did not perceive twenty-five percent to fifty per-
cent bonuses as profitable, even when municipal revenue bonds
(MRBs) also were offered. The Concord program reduced upzonings
and, therefore, reduced the number of housing units built compared to
sale. The interest rate on the second trust deed was about two percentage points below
market rates. Part of the logic behind the second trust deed was to help buyers qualify
for purchase loans they would ordinarily be unable to receive. Because no payments are
made to the city for two years, the lender of the first trust deed does not consider the
full debt burden in underwriting the loan. The later, graduated payments on the second
mortgage could cause problems, however, for buyers whose incomes do not increase
over time as anticipated. The payment schedule is designed to be affordable to house-
holds on fixed incomes, assuming they receive cost-of-living increases equal to inflation.
Although the city will accumulate housing development funds from its second trust
deeds, there are no program guidelines for the use of such funds. Furthermore, nothing
legally requires future city councils to use this money for affordable housing.
38. The other program was a straight 25% bonus pursuant to the state law which,
due to inadequate affordability definitions, granted no greater affordability than market-
rate projects. The state law uses countywide median income; in cities with median in-
comes below the county's median, the moderate-income units may not be below market
in price or rent because of low land costs.
39. One official confidentially told us that permitted densities were lowered prior to
the adoption of the density bonus program.
40. Interview with John Woodbury, City of Concord Planner (Mar. 15, 1984).
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what probably would have been built without the density bonus
program.
C. Economic Analysis of Hypothetical Projects
To examine the effects of different levels of incentives, land prices,
and income requirements on profits, we performed rate-of-return
(IRR) calculations for projects with density bonus and MRB incen-
tives, for two levels of land cost, and for two rates of annual rent in-
crease. Table 1 displays the IRR results for four project types. The
baseline project has 160 market-rate units. The state-mandated density
bonus case adds 16 low-income units (10%) to the baseline case and
25% more total units are built. We used low-income units instead of
moderate-income units because, in both case-study cities, demand for
moderate-income rental units was met by market supply. For compari-
son, we examine an MRB project with 160 units, of which 20% (32)
are low income, as required by the federal MRB regulations. The 10%
DB/MRB case has 40 low-income units out of a total of 200 (the 10%
low-income units required by the bonus program are counted as part of
the 20% required by the MRB program).
Because our data will not apply absolutely to many actual situations,
the relative differences among IRRs are more important than their ab-
solute levels. Table 1 shows how the two most frequently used incen-
tives affect profit. The state density bonus program adds one to two
percentage points to the baseline project's IRR for both assumed rates
of rent increase and for both land price cases. This is a modest but
positive incentive. The IRR increase occurs because there is no extra
land cost for the bonus units and because of the economies of scale in
the construction of the larger project.4 ' MRB financing adds two to
three percentage points to the IRR of the baseline project. This helps
account for the popularity of MRBs. Another advantage of MRBs is
that the developer does not have to redesign the project for more units.
The best return is from the DB/MRB project, with an IRR four to five
percentage points higher than that of the baseline project.
Table 1 shows that the state-mandated density bonus program does
not increase the overall IRR significantly. A supplementary calcula-
tion, however, shows that the IRR on the extra investment for the six-
teen bonus units is considerably higher than the IRR on the whole
41. Per-unit costs for all units are reduced four to five percent. Telephone interview
with George Dutton, Developer in Santa Rosa (Oct. 17 and Nov. 1, 1985).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/5
DENSITY BONUS INCENTIVES
TABLE 1
The effect of density bonus and mortgage revenue bond incentives on project
internal rate-of-return
Yearly Rate of Rent Increase: 5% - 7%
Diff. Above Diff. Above
IRR % Baseline IRR % Baseline
Moderate-Low Cost City:
I. Baseline (160/0; 13%)* 22.5 - 26.4
2. BD (184/16; 13%) 23.9 1.4 27.8 1.4
3. MRB (123/32; 10%) 25.6 3.1 29.2 2.8
4. DB/MRB (160/40; 10%) 27.3 4.8 30.8 4.4
Moderate-High-Cost City:
1. Baseline (160/0; 13%) 23.7 - 27.6
2. DB (184/16; 13%) 25.5 1.8 29.3 1.7
3. MRB (128/32; 10%) 26.2 2.5 29.7 2.1
4. DB/MRB (160/40; 10%) 28.4 4.7 31.9 4.3
* Numbers in parentheses are market-rate units/affordable units and loan interest
rate, respectively.
NOTE: 30-year, fixed payment mortgage, vacancy factor of 5%, based on sale at end of
year 10. O&M costs are 20% of rent revenue. Property tax is 1.1% of capital value
(reassessed annually). Straight-line, 15-year depreciation. Rate of increase of capital
value is the same as rate of increase in rents. Federal plus state income tax rate is 50%.
Real estate commission at scale is 6%. Capital gains tax rate (at sale) is 20%. Discount
rate is 12% (nominal rate). Construction cost per unit in baseline and MRB-only
projects is $37,300; construction cost for additional units, above the baseline, is assumed
to be $29,800 per unit, due to economies of scale. In the four moderately low land-price
cases, the market rent in year I is $530/month (averaged for a mix of 1- and 3-bedroom
units). The low-income rent is 14% lower, or $455/month. The land cost is $1.2
million. In the four moderately high land-price cases, the market rent (in year 1) is
$634/month and the low-income rent is 26% less, or $472/month. The land cost is
$2.2 million.
density bonus project.42 The marginal return is thirty-two to thirty-six
percent, making the bonus units an excellent investment. The same
advantage accrues to the DB/MRB project.
These IRR projections assume that land prices did not increase due
to the density bonus and MRB programs. Hence, these results repre-
42. We performed separate IRR calculations for the additional investment for the
DB projects. In the DB projects, the net present value is higher, but so is the down
payment. Depending on the jurisdiction's permit procedures, the developer may need a
higher IRR to cover the costs of delay and of redesigning extra units and modifying
layouts.
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sent medium-term situations and assume that the incentive programs
are applied to only a fraction of projects that are not identified in ad-
vance. Under these conditions, land prices are not likely to increase in
anticipation of higher project profits. Where either density bonus or
MRB programs are applied to a high percentage of projects, however,
and profits rise as shown in our calculations, land prices should rise
until project rates of return fall to normal levels. Our financial analysis
and the Santa Rosa case study confirm Kleven's assertion that incen-
tives could be excessive so as to create above-normal profits in the short
term.43
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Effect of Incentive Level on Project Profits
The statutory bonus may be too low to gain the participation of a
sizable fraction of jurisdictions, as indicated by the moderate participa-
tion rate found in our statewide survey. Half of the participating local
governments augmented the bonus program with MRBs and other in-
centives. This indicates that the state bonus is probably too low in
many jurisdictions.
How do we reconcile this finding with the results of the economic
model, which show a high marginal IRR for projects using density bo-
nuses exclusively? Although the rate of return on the bonus units in
the density bonus project is higher than the rate of return on the base-
line project, it may not be large enough to entice developers to take on
the added risk and trouble inherent in building the affordable units.
The added costs include delay and redesign of the project. The risks
include possible delays in selling the larger number of units and a po-
tential reduction in the prices of the market units because of the higher
density. Another possible cost is reduced rents or sale prices of mar-
ket-rate units near the affordable ones.' Screening and layout can re-
duce or eliminate this problem, except in small projects.45 For these
reasons, developers may wish to receive other incentives instead of the
density bonus.
43. See Kleven, supra note 1, at 1445 (short-term "windfall" arises from purchase of
units at price lower than market level, as required by law, and immediate resale of units
at market price); see supra text accompanying note 21.
44. CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, THE FEASIBILITY OF THE
DENSITY BONUS IN RELATION TO INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS (1980).
45. See S. SCHWARTZ & R. JOHNSTON, supra note 6, at 15, 17-18.
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Our findings corroborate previous research concluding that develop-
ers participate when bonuses are high or when other incentives are also
offered. Many cities and counties have offered the program with incen-
tives higher than those required by law, and developers have used the
program significantly in its early years. These statistics indicate that
Ellickson may not be correct in dismissing local incentives as a way of
making inclusionary housing programs work without reducing the sup-
ply of new units.46 The state should monitor the performance of these
programs and, if the participation rate for local governments does not
rise, the law should be modified to require local governments to in-
crease the bonus where necessary.
B. Effect of County Median Income and Local Land Prices on
Developer Participation
Our statewide survey showed that the highest use of the program
occurred in jurisdictions with both high and low reported land values
located in counties with both high and low incomes.47
Changes in density bonus project returns are not sensitive to land
prices in the short run because no extra land is required. Contrary to
intuition, we believe that it may be profitable to build density bonus
projects in communities with high land prices when the communities
are within high- and average-income counties. This is true because
land costs for bonus units are zero, construction costs are roughly the
same everywhere, and high or average county median income allows
for profitable rent and price levels.
C. Agencies' Use of Varied Incentives and Income Requirements to
Prevent Abnormally High Profits
Santa Rosa attempted to design incentives and requirements to keep
profits from rising in for-sale projects. The city granted modest incen-
tives to a significant number of for-sale housing units, all of which
came under initial price controls. The city did not, however, do this
for rental projects, where its motive was to increase supply rapidly.
Very high density bonuses (150-175%) were granted to rental projects,
most of which also received MRB financing and came under ten-year
46. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1215-16.
47. A third state survey likewise showed that large numbers of density bonus units
had been approved in jurisdictions of widely varying economic characteristics. See CAL-
IFORNIA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE CALIFORNIA PLANNER'S 1986
BoOx OF LISTs 123-25 (1986).
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rent controls. The MRB rental requirements did not require any sub-
sidy by the developer in most cases. Almost all rental projects used the
program, indicating that profits probably increased.
In contrast, Concord offered fifty percent density bonuses for rental
projects with rent controls and twenty-five percent bonuses for for-sale
projects with initial price controls. The city staff performed IRR cal-
culations for each project and attempted to vary incentives on an indi-
vidual basis to keep profits from rising. Not many projects used the
program, indicating that Concord was successful in holding profits to
normal levels.
It is likely that in some jurisdictions developers can build moderate-
income units without subsidizing them, thereby increasing profits from
the density bonus in the short term. In the long term, landowners will
capture any above-normal profits. In Santa Rosa, for example, the
1980 median market rent was 18.8% of the city's median income, the
middle of the income range defined as "moderate" (80-120% of me-
dian), and so moderate-income units could be built with no subsidy.
Density bonus programs could increase housing affordability, even
in these cities and counties where moderate-income units require no
subsidy, if the rents of the affordable units could be set at low-income
levels. Currently, the state law gives the developer the choice of build-
ing units for low-income, moderate-income, or elderly households.48
D. Use of Rent and Price Controls
The state's survey showed that sixty-two percent of participating ju-
risdictions imposed rent and price controls for five to fifty years even
though state law does not require such ongoing controls. The partici-
pating cities and counties apparently wished to maintain program ben-
efits for the target populations. We believe that the national MRB
program has introduced local governments to rent controls and there-
fore has increased the use of these measures in the California density
bonus program.
Rent and price controls, if used in a program that is voluntary for
developers, will not reduce developer profits below normal levels and
will not reduce the supply of new units.49 Rent and price controls,
48. In Concord, the 1980 median market rent was only 15.4% of median income,
and moderate-income units could be built without subsidy. The low participation rate
by developers of rental projects must be due to the increased costs and risk of building
density bonus projects.
49. Such a program could avoid the problems discussed in Ellickson, supra note 2.
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moreover, are necessary if the affordable units are to continue provid-
ing the intended housing benefits. Local programs that do not admin-
ister such controls are merely displacing normal market supply at
somewhat higher densities, and are providing windfall benefits to first
renters and first buyers.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Jurisdictions vary considerably in their methods of implementing the
state density bonus mandate. Developers use the program in both
high-income localities and those with high land values. Many jurisdic-
tions offer greater incentives than those required by the state. Most
participating jurisdictions require ongoing rent and price controls to
maintain affordability.
The affordability and bonus standards in the state law, however, are
not appropriate for all jurisdictions. The statute should be amended to
reflect that some communities need incentives that are higher than the
statutory bonus. To keep the program units affordable, the state legis-
lature should also require rent and price controls for at least twenty
years, pegged to increases in county median rents and housing costs
and enforced by deed restrictions. Another problem is that the statute
allows developers to build moderate-income units in some jurisdictions
with no subsidy to the moderate-income units. The statute should be
amended to eliminate the moderate-income option in a jurisdiction
when the median market rent falls below a specified percentage of the
median household income. Such a provision could increase participa-
tion by developers in producing low-income units and increase pro-
gram benefits.
In its current form, the California law is a qualified success in en-
couraging the provision of a large number of low- and moderate-in-
come units. We have suggested ways of strengthening the statute. The
program of "selling" density increases in exchange for developer-subsi-
dized housing should interest other states and many cities and urban
counties. The program may help produce affordable housing without
the adverse market effects of jurisdiction-wide rent controls and
mandatory inclusionary programs without incentives.
The state should continue to monitor this program through detailed
investigations into the questions raised in this Article. Further re-
search should focus on types and levels of incentives, the rents and
prices of the affordable units, and market conditions in individual
jurisdictions.
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